This entry relates to the first conversion post and the comments pertaining to that post. Just to reiterate: I would love to hear from more folks on this topic. In order to keep the conversation going, I wanted to briefly respond to the comments that were made.
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First, I think Jeff is quite right to raise questions about my use of the term "self." My use of this term in the first post was no doubt problematic. So, I'd like to make an attempt to further distinguish between self and identity.
Jeff states that "there is some underlying foundation of self onto which identity is written." I then take him to go on to elaborate on this underlying foundation as a biological phenomenon ("[The self] is the sum of everything that exists in my brain"). I certainly think these observations point us in the right direction, as does Rositsa's understanding of a ever-present self constituted by the bear faculty of cognition. Nevertheless, I think we could fill out the picture a bit more.
I think that the phrase "identity is written" uses an entirely appropriate metaphor. Identity is something of a hermeneutical process. Our identity is an interpretation of certain facts. What facts? Most probably the exact self-facts that Jeff notes: propensities, memories, and so on and so forth.* In so far as we treat these things as facts, they exist on a level field, so to speak. None is more pressing or important than any other. And so here, we might be tempted to say that changing any one of these self-facts is to effect only a small change in identity.
However, when I say that identity is a hermeneutical process, I mean to say that it arranges these facts in a certain way. Namely, it creates something like a hierarchy of facts. That is to say, it draws a distinction between important facts and those which are less important. (E.g. It is essential that I am a Muslim woman, but it is fairly inconsequential that I know that C6H12O6 is the chemical formula Glucose.) And so, because identity is the structure that arranges these facts in terms of value, changing a particularly important self-fact - I change the fact "I am a Muslim" to the fact "I am an agnostic" - or restructuring the importance of certain facts - "I am a Muslim" gives way to other facts, such as "I am a mother" - indicates not simply some insignificant change in a web of facts, but an alteration of my entire identity.
To this, I would add that the existence of "bare" self-facts, independent of any identity - or structured-self - is suspect. Our experience of ourselves and our choices is always mediated by some identity. It is this identity that provides the background against which we are able to make certain existential judgments**: I should go to the grocery store because I am a father with hungry children.
The difficulty underlying changes of identity, is that judgments must be made both against the background of an identity and regarding identity. A parallel here can be drawn to Kuhn's conception of scientific revolutions. In the midst of a revolutionary period, there is some confusion about what criteria of judgment (i.e. theory) is to be used to understand any given set of facts (also theory). Likewise, we can assume that there is some period of identity breakdown around the time of transformation. We do not "decide" to assume one identity over another is not made from some standpoint outside of either identity. Rather, we see one identity begin to wobble, and by the time the other identity "takes over" the "decision" is complete. There is no sense talking about "who" - outside of either identity - makes this decision. To ask this sort of question is sort of like asking "who" is president during an inauguration ceremony.
The distinction between transformation and conversion seems much more difficult to handle. We are tempted to say: you know it when you see it. Since this is obviously an unsatisfying answer I think we definitely have more discussion on that matter. I'd also welcome any and all feedback on this post. I'm studying greek lots lately, so I don't know how cogent it is at this point.
Also a brief response to Swanditch: An interesting psychological point, though I think perhaps Hoffer is brazen to classify religious fervor as a sort of pathology. Although we may want to clasify certain types of religious belief as pathological, I think it would be a grave mistake to place ALL religious belief under the category of pathology. Certainly we must leave room for the possibility of non-pathological religious belief - after all, whatever type of pathology underlies religious belief, I doubt if it differs much in kind from other human neuroses.
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*Whether or not we cash these facts out as biological facts does not interest me here.
** I think, contrary to Rositsa, that there cannot be a bare faculty of cognition that makes judgments "in a vacuum," apart from any particular identity. This faculty always judges against the background of some particular identity.
3 comments:
"Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death. If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present." - Ludwig Wittgenstein
This line leapt out at me when I first read the book it's in. The corollary is that those who do not live in the present will die, and in a sense are already dead.
Gotama has this to say:
“Bhikkhu, ‘I am’ is a conceiving; ‘I am this’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall not be’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be possessed of form’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be formless’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be non-percipient’ is a conceiving; ‘I shall be neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient’ is a conceiving. Conceiving is a disease, conceiving is a tumour, conceiving is a dart. By overcoming all conceivings, bhikkhu, one is called a sage at peace. And the sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die; he is not shaken and does not yearn. For there is nothing present in him by which he might be born. Not being born, how could he age? Not ageing, how could he die? Not dying, how could he be shaken? Not being shaken, for what should he yearn?” - MN 140:31
It seems that from Wittgenstein's and Gotama's perspective all conceiving, all belief that reality is this way or that way, is mental illness, is pathology. However there are conceivings that lead to the destruction of conceivings.
Hi swanditch,
Didn't realize you were using the term "pathology" in the Buddhist sense. (I didn't recognize the user name, but I'm guessing that this is someone from Great Vow.)
First of all, thanks so much for your comment. It is both helpful and interesting to hear what someone from the Buddhist perspective might have to say about these things.
Once again returning to the subject of pathology. I don't know that I'm capable of judging what LW would say to this exactly. It would seem that he does not take our ways of conceiving as absolute - and in a certain way, he sees taking them that way as a sort of sickness, we get trapped by certain ways of picturing the world - instead he seems to recommend something like recognizing that our conceptions have meaning according to the situations and ways in which we use them. Nevertheless, I wouldn't exactly classify this as the absence of any conceptions; it's just that we are able to use different conceptions for different purposes and ultimately, that which directs our use of these concepts is not some further concept, rather, it is skillful action (We apply this concept, in this place and time, skillfully). I wonder how this squares with the Buddha's notion? What do you think?
I don't really know enough about Buddhism and this part has always perplexed me. It would seem that in Buddhism the absolute would be beyond concepts/the absence of concepts, but certainly in our day to day life, we must employ conceptions. Would enlightened action be something like being able to use relative conceptions, but also seeing them as empty? Moreover, what exactly does that mean?
Another question your comment brought up for me is this: is it possible from a Buddhist perspective to distinguish between pathology and pathology? That is to say, the pathology related to possessing any concept seems - at least to me - to be of a different kind or degree from that of what we ordinarily call pathology (masochistic tendencies - in Weil's case, say). I suppose in the end, the Buddhist might want to say that both cause suffering - and really, what would it mean to say that suffering differs in degree? If the goal is to end all suffering, then it is to end suffering whether it is small or big. What do you think?
Finally, I'm perplexed by the last line: What would be a conceiving that leads to the destruction of conceivings? That is to say, is it on par with other conceivings?
As I said at the beginning, I'm glad you're commenting, I hope you'll continue.
Nevertheless, I wouldn't exactly classify this as the absence of any conceptions; it's just that we are able to use different conceptions for different purposes and ultimately, that which directs our use of these concepts is not some further concept, rather, it is skillful action (We apply this concept, in this place and time, skillfully). I wonder how this squares with the Buddha's notion? What do you think?
This is how I think of it.
I don't really know enough about Buddhism and this part has always perplexed me. It would seem that in Buddhism the absolute would be beyond concepts/the absence of concepts, but certainly in our day to day life, we must employ conceptions. Would enlightened action be something like being able to use relative conceptions, but also seeing them as empty?
This too is how I think of it.
Moreover, what exactly does that mean?
There is only one way to find out.
Another question your comment brought up for me is this: is it possible from a Buddhist perspective to distinguish between pathology and pathology? That is to say, the pathology related to possessing any concept seems - at least to me - to be of a different kind or degree from that of what we ordinarily call pathology (masochistic tendencies - in Weil's case, say). I suppose in the end, the Buddhist might want to say that both cause suffering - and really, what would it mean to say that suffering differs in degree? If the goal is to end all suffering, then it is to end suffering whether it is small or big. What do you think?
I am not wise enough to say. From my perspective some people actually are insane and need medical treatment.
Finally, I'm perplexed by the last line: What would be a conceiving that leads to the destruction of conceivings?
"I will practice for the destruction of conceivings."
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